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This article offers a critical engagement with literatures on contemporary global power shifts 
and the phenomenon of ‘regime complexity’. It does so by focusing on South Africa’s role in 
the governance of cross-border investment, and using this case to explore the strategies used 
by rising powers to pursue their strategic aims in institutionally complex and fragmented global 
governance regimes. The article situates an understanding of regime complexity within a 
critical constructivist literature that highlights the ambiguity of international norms and the 
relationship between power and strategic rhetorical action. It argues that complex regimes 
create space for agency and strategic action by states and highlights one specific strategy – 
norm shopping – that rising powers can use to legitimate their actions and challenge dominant 
norms in complex regimes. 
 




It is no surprise that contemporary interest in the phenomenon of international ‘regime 
complexity’ (Raustiala and Victor 2004) – a situation in which governance is fragmented into 
a series of overlapping organisations, rules and norms – coincides with a period characterised 
by dramatic shifts in global economic power. Materialist understandings of state power 
dominate conventional accounts of the causes and consequences of regime complexity. In brief, 
the fragmentation of international institutions is often understood as a result of the decline of 
hegemony and rise of multipolarity, while its consequence is generally thought to be a shift 
from rules-based to power-based modes of international politics (Drezner 2009, 2010, 2013). 
Assuming that regime complexity is an important emergent feature of the global political 
landscape, however, the conventional preoccupation with the material power of states obscures 
important questions about its political consequences. Namely, how do those states outside of a 
core group of great powers engage with institutionally complex governance landscapes? 
 
In the context of this special issue, this is an important question for those countries that are 
counted, or count themselves, amongst the ranks of ‘rising powers’. Their growing power is 
typically viewed in terms of rapid economic growth and a rising share of global wealth (see, 
for example, Arrighi 2007, Drezner 2007, Emmott 2008, Ikenberry 2008, Wade 2011, Zakaria 
2011; for a critique, see Hopewell 2015). Yet the reality is that many of those that are 
conventionally categorised as rising powers – Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico 
– do not come close to matching the clout of either the established global powers or the largest 
rising power, China, when measured in these terms (see Bishop 2016). Their commonality is 
better thought of as an intersubjective identity as ‘rising powers’ and a broadly defined agenda 
for the reform of global economic governance, as opposed to a set of objective material 
characteristics. This raises the question of how such moderately resourced but ambitious states 




This article explores this question through the case of South Africa, a mid-sized power but one 
that is part of various forums and coalitions that indicate rising power status – including the 
BRICS and G20 – and that is keen to construct its own image as an important player in the 
reform of global governance. Specifically, it investigates South Africa’s strategies for 
engagement with the regime complex for cross-border investment. Here, in the context of 
considerable institutional fragmentation and complexity, South Africa has sought to challenge 
core normative tenets of the investment regime, both in its domestic investment policies and 
through its interventions in the wider regime. 
 
In order to understand these strategies, I depart with materialist accounts of regime complexity 
to instead explore this phenomenon through a critical constructivist lens. This focuses attention 
on the normative ambiguity and opportunities for strategic action that are created by regime 
complexity, while stressing the strategic use of rhetoric as a power resource by states. Using 
this lens, I develop the concept of ‘norm shopping’ as a way of understanding how rising 
powers can navigate complex regimes in strategic ways: this is the selective use and 
construction of norms situated within complex regimes in order to legitimate policy proposals 
or negotiating positions. In this way, as well as being shaped by material inequalities, power is 
constructed through strategic discursive engagement with the complex institutional 
environment in which states find themselves. I argue that norm shopping is a particularly useful 
strategy for rising powers that are seeking to contest aspects of the prevailing international order. 
 
The article proceeds in four main sections: the first outlines my theoretical approach to power 
and ambiguity in complex regimes and introduces the concept of norm shopping; the second 
provides a brief historical account of the emergence of the global governance regime for cross-
border investment; the third offers a detailed examination of South Africa’s use of norm 
shopping in its investment policy rhetoric; and the fourth considers the future of the investment 
regime in the light of the preceding discussion.1 Taken as a whole, the case of South Africa’s 
engagement with the governance of cross-border investment highlights the way in which 
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regime complexity generates ambiguities that allow space for engagement and contestation by 
rising powers. 
 
Norm Shopping in Complex Regimes 
The contemporary literature on regime complexity and its political consequences has its origins 
in classic IPE debates about hegemonic stability and the theories of international regimes that 
emerged from the latter. Early theories of hegemonic stability asserted that an open 
international economic order was most likely to emerge and persist under conditions of 
hegemony (Gilpin 1972, Kindleberger 1973, Krasner 1976, Keohane 1980). Increasing 
attention on regimes – defined by Stephen D. Krasner (1983) as sets of explicit or implicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in a given area of international politics 
– coincided with perceived US hegemonic decline beginning in the 1970s. Liberal 
institutionalists, in particular, stressed the capacity of regimes to sustain international 
cooperation and openness even in the absence of a hegemon (Keohane 1984). 
 
Despite their acknowledgement of the role of regimes in governing the global economy, 
Realists in particular retained a central concern with state power and interests (see, for example, 
Krasner 1983). With this in mind, they observed the way in which great powers used strategic 
forum-shopping in order to realise desired outcomes (Drezner 2010). In the area of trade, for 
example, a longstanding strand of literature identifies the tendency of large powers to seek to 
negotiate preferential trade agreements (PTAs) outside the multilateral arena during periods of 
deadlock in the latter (Schott 1989, Bergsten 1996, Bhagwati 1993, Krugman 1993, Panagariya 
1998). Furthermore, trade scholars frequently suggest that deadlock in multilateral negotiations 
and associated institutional fragmentation is most likely in the context of multipolarity, when 
no individual power is strong enough to force through its agenda.2 
 
Building on this foundation, the emerging literature on international regime complexity 
presents a compelling case that the proliferation of overlapping rules, norms and organisations 
is becoming an increasingly salient issue in many areas of global politics (Goldstein et al. 2001, 
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Raustiala and Victor 2004, Aggarwal 2005, Alter and Meunier 2006, 2009, Benvenisti and 
Downs 2007, Drezner 2013, Orsini et al. 2013, Gehring and Faude 2014, Gómez-Mera 2015). 
In its assessment of the political implications of this phenomenon, the dominant strand in this 
literature picks up the thread of earlier Realist work on regimes, emphasising the power of 
states to shape and navigate institutional landscapes. Specifically, the argument here is that the 
fracturing of multilateral institutions and the proliferation of overlapping governance venues 
and norms presages a shift from rules-based to power-based modes of international politics. 
This is because complex regimes provide opportunities for forum shopping by great powers, 
allowing those with superior material capabilities and state capacity to navigate overlapping 
rules and organisations in ways that maximise their leverage (Drezner 2009, 2013, see also 
Raustiala and Victor 2004, Alter and Meunier 2009). Scholarship on the fragmentation of 
international legal systems has reached similar conclusions (Benvenisti and Downs 2007). 
 
Some scholars have questioned the conclusion that regime complexity necessarily leads to 
power-based political outcomes (Alter and Meunier 2009, Gehring and Faude 2013, Orsini et 
al. 2013). However, as yet there has been little exploration of how those states outside of the 
core group of great powers engage with or respond to situations of institutional complexity at 
the international level. This is at least in part a consequence of the dominance of materialist 
conceptions of state power in the regime complexity literature, which tends to obscure the 
relevance of ‘weaker’ states and their actions. As a corrective to this, I turn to constructivist 
literatures in IR and IPE. Where both Neoliberal Institutionalist and Realist scholars consider 
regimes to be the product of interaction between rational utility-maximising actors, a now-
extensive constructivist literature draws attention to the way international rules and norms 
shape actors’ identities and interests (see, inter alia, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, Finnemore 2003, Hall 2003, Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Of particular 
relevance is a branch of ‘critical’ constructivism that deals with the ambiguity of social norms 
and their relationship to power. 
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Antje Wiener has been most influential in highlighting the ambiguity and contestedness of 
norms in international politics. Specifically, she rejects the ‘behaviourism’ of research that 
treats norms as fixed social facts and instead proposes a ‘reflexive’ understanding of norms 
(Wiener 2004, 2007). This emphasises the ‘dual quality’ of norms as both structuring state 
behaviour and constructed by it. As such, Wiener (2004, p. 200) views norms as ‘always in 
principle contested’ (for a critique of Wiener’s approach, see Niemann and Schillinger 2016). 
In a similar vein and engaging explicitly with regime theory, Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan 
Verbeek (2007) argue that norm research should consider the vague and elusive quality of 
norms, as opposed to simply whether they are obeyed or disregarded. Such an approach permits 
a view of norms that sees them as contested and contestable, and challenges conventional views 
of norm diffusion as a top-down process that flows from Global North to Global South (see 
Epstein 2012a, Bloomfield 2016, Wiener 2017, Zimmerman et al. 2017). 
 
While critical constructivists highlight the ambiguity and contestedness of norms, they rarely 
engage explicitly with the issue of complexity. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007, p. 223) 
point out that conventional norm research has tended to conclude that denser and more complex 
regimes will result in rules-based outcomes as states lose control over norms and instead opt 
for compliance. This, however, assumes that the norms embodied in dense and complex 
regimes are coherent and unambiguous and that states interpret and respond to them in uniform 
ways. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek (2007) call this assumption into question through their 
examination of the contestation of norms within the highly legalized context of the European 
Union. Building on this, I suggest that in situations of regime complexity normative ambiguity 
is likely to be pronounced: competing or contradictory norms may exist in different 
organisational settings, norms may be combined in different ways in different parts of a regime 
complex, and different organisational settings may create opportunities for reinterpreting or 
reconstructing existing norms. Consequently, the ambiguities created by such complexity 
create space for creative agency that extends beyond the great powers. 
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To capture the agency of both materially strong and weaker states, I turn to critical 
constructivists who have dealt with the issue of power. Conventional norm research has tended 
to treat ideas and power as separate and competing modes of explanation, arguing that norms 
spread through rational processes of persuasion and socialisation rather than coercion (for 
critiques, see Krebs and Jackson 2007, Epstein 2012a, 2012b). By contrast, I follow Ronald R. 
Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2007) in suggesting that norms and power are intricately 
intertwined. Through their concept of ‘rhetorical coercion’, they argue that the maintenance of 
rule by the powerful rests on legitimacy generated through rhetorical action: the task for actors 
seeking to project power by establishing legitimacy is thus to talk their opponents ‘into a corner’ 
(Krebs and Jackson 2007, p. 36). Furthermore, successful strategies for doing so are embedded 
within ‘communities of discourse’, in which actors must draw on shared rhetorical tools in 
order to make claims that are ‘socially sustainable’ (Krebs and Jackson 2007, p. 45–7). Another 
way of putting this – and linking it back to the earlier discussion of regimes – is to suggest that 
the rhetorical action of purposive agents is structured by the norms that are present in regimes. 
These set the parameters of socially sustainable rhetorical action, albeit in ways that are 
ambiguous and open to interpretation and contestation. 
 
Krebs and Jackson (2007, p. 55–7) suggest that, on the whole, rhetorical coercion is likely to 
be less frequent and effective in international politics than in the domestic arena, where social 
ties in political communities are denser. However, other scholars have pointed to the ways in 
which weaker states have used similar modes of strategic rhetorical action as a power resource 
in the international arena. For example, Hobson and Seabrooke’s (2007) concept of ‘mimetic 
challenge’ describes a strategy in which weaker actors make discursive appeals to established 
institutional rules, norms or standards in order to legitimise their own actions or to challenge 
the behaviour of more conventionally powerful actors (see also, Schimmelfennig 2001, 
Sharman 2007).  
 
Pulling these insights from the regime complexity and critical constructivist literatures together, 
I propose the concept of ‘norm shopping’ as a way of capturing the strategic ways in which 
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conventionally weaker states can engage with the ambiguous and uneven normative landscape 
that is created by the existence of overlapping and intersecting rules, norms, standards and 
practices in international politics.  In conventional accounts of the political implications of 
regime complexity, ‘forum shopping’ describes the process by which powerful actors select 
regulatory or negotiating venues that will maximise their material leverage – for example by 
bypassing multilateral institutions that create opportunities for weaker actors to engage in 
coalition-building and issue-linkage. ‘Norm shopping’, by contrast, describes a strategy in 
which actors selectively engage with norms situated within complex regimes in order to make 
rhetorical arguments that help to legitimate their actions.  
 
Specifically, where contradictory or ambiguous norms exist within a complex regime the 
strategy of norm shopping involves states and their diplomatic agents constructing policy 
choices or negotiating positions as legitimate through selective appeal to norms that exist – or 
that can be (re)constructed – within specific parts of a complex organisational setting. 3  
Importantly, these norms may not be reflected in the dominant normative character of the 
regime complex as a whole. Through the case study of South African investment policy below, 
I describe two discursive tactics that come under the broad heading of norm shopping. These 
are (1) the use of norms contained in an overarching multilateral institution in order to 
legitimise behaviour in nested regional or bilateral negotiations; and (2) shaping or developing 
new norms in a parallel or peripheral organisational setting before applying them to justify 
action in another part of a regime complex. This is not an exhaustive typology of norm-
shopping strategies, but is indicative of the sort of strategic opportunities for discursive action 
that may emerge in complex, nested and interconnected institutional settings. 
 
My contention is that norm-shopping strategies are particularly useful for states that identify as 
rising powers and that are seeking the reform of global economic governance through their 
increasingly active engagement. Clearly, a substantial degree of bureaucratic and diplomatic 
capacity is required for states to engage with multiple forums across complex regimes, 
something that may be more feasible for larger and ambitious states from the Global South than 
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for other developing countries. Nonetheless, these strategies are open to aspiring rising powers 
like South Africa that cannot come close to matching the conventional power resources of either 
the established great powers or larger rising powers. The active construction of rising power 
identity may also be important in gaining access to debates and negotiations taking place in 
exclusive organisational settings in emerging regime complexes – for example, the BRICS 
group or the G20. Beyond this, a norm-shopping strategy can support reform agendas that are 
associated with rising powers’ engagement with global economic governance. Specifically, the 
incoherence and ambiguity that is generated by complexity may provide opportunities for rising 
powers to challenge dominant norms within existing regimes.  
 
Institutionalising ‘Investment Protection and Liberalisation’ in the Investment Regime 
Complex, 1945-2000 
This section briefly describes the institutionalisation of ‘investment protection and 
liberalisation’ as the dominant norm in the investment regime complex that emerged after 
1945.4 The core principles that underpinned this norm can be loosely summarised as follows: 
(1) international investment flows increase overall global prosperity; (2) inward investment 
promotes economic growth, efficiency and competitiveness at the national level; therefore (3) 
state restrictions on the establishment of foreign investment should be limited (investment 
liberalisation); and (4) foreign investment should be encouraged by establishing property rights 
for investors in international law (investment protection). The partial and uneven 
institutionalisation of the ‘investment protection and liberalisation’ norm in the form of an 
investment regime complex was the result of an incremental and contested process of 
negotiation between capital-exporting developed countries and capital-importing developing 
countries in this period.  
 
From 1945 to the late 1970s, the dominant norm described above was broadly opposed by 
developing countries, which generally favoured limits on investment liberalisation and resisted 
international legal protections for foreign investors. As a result, attempts to bring about binding 
investment provisions in multilateral institutions – including the abortive International Trade 
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Organisation, the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) – all met with failure. Instead, European countries and later the United 
States pursued protection for their overseas investors via a network of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), which became a central pillar of the investment regime complex. These almost 
all included commitments that proscribed discrimination and expropriation in the post-
establishment phase, while also providing a variety of other protections for foreign investors, 
often in broad and vague terms (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 26). BITs lacked an overarching 
multilateral focal point, but were promoted by various multilateral institutions – including the 
World Bank, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the OECD – 
from the 1980s onwards (Poulsen 2015). Their proliferation was also accompanied by the 
development of a set of arbitration institutions, foremost amongst which was the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) at the World Bank. Although many 
developing countries had earlier rejected the notion of special protections for foreign investors 
in multilateral forums, through BITs they committed themselves to treaty obligations that 
provided protections beyond national treatment and outside domestic legal regimes, seemingly 
in the belief that this would serve to attract inward investment (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 13, 
Poulsen 2014, 2015). 
 
Alongside the proliferation of BITs, the US renewed efforts to enshrine substantive protections 
for investment in the multilateral trade regime as part of the Tokyo (1973-9) and Uruguay 
(1986-94) rounds in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), once again with 
limited success (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 191). The Uruguay Round’s conclusion brought only 
minimal investment liberalisation via the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) (Reiter 2006, p. 216–7). In 
this context, investment liberalisation and protection increasingly became the purview of 
regional and bilateral PTAs, the aim of which was to advance a ‘deep’ trade liberalisation 
agenda that had stalled in the multilateral arena (Vandevelde 2005, Heron and Siles-Brügge 
2012, Siles-Brügge 2014). This began with the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) (1994), which included national and most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment for 
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investment in the pre- and post-establishment phases (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 18). This 
became the model for further US PTAs, while pre-establishment investment liberalisation was 
increasingly also incorporated in EU PTAs from the late 1990s onwards (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, 
p. 18). By the 2000s, comprehensive PTAs were becoming the preferred model for investment 
liberalisation and protection on the part of capital-exporting developed countries. Where BITs 
lacked a multilateral focal point, PTAs were nested under the GATT/WTO in the trade regime 
and partially governed by Article XXIV of the GATT, which sets out criteria by which states 
can engage in preferential trade liberalisation, albeit concerning goods only and not other trade-
related issues. 
 
Taking all this together, the norm of ‘investment protection and liberalisation’ had come to 
dominate the investment regime complex that had emerged by the late 1990s. Yet the 
complexity that was produced by the ad hoc process through which the regime was created 
meant that the institutionalisation of this norm was incomplete. The network of investment rules 
contained within BITs and PTAs – as well as its links to embedded and evolving sets of norms 
in various parts of the landscape of global economic governance, from the GATT, to UNCTAD, 
the OECD and the World Bank – created opportunities for rising powers to use selective 
engagement with existing aspects of the regime complex in order to challenge its central norm. 
 
South Africa’s Norm-Shopping Strategies in the Investment Regime Complex, 1994-2017 
During the period following South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, the governing 
African National Congress’ (ANC) economic policy shifted from an embrace of the prevailing 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy in the late 1990s towards an increasingly state-oriented and 
interventionist economic strategy from the 2000s onwards.5 It engaged actively with the global 
economic governance landscape throughout this period, but from the mid-2000s adopted more 
reformist aims. South Africa’s position on the governance of investment mirrored these broader 
shifts. Specifically, the government moved from embracing the dominant ‘investment 
protection and liberalisation’ norm in the late 1990s to instead adopting a ‘regulated investment’ 
norm from the mid-2000s onwards. The latter does not reject the core principle that foreign 
 13 
investment is good for economic growth, but (1) argues that investment should be regulated by 
the state if it is to have a positive impact, and (2) favours domestic regulation of investment 
over international treaty commitments. In order to legitimate its position, South Africa 
navigated the complex landscape of the investment regime using a norm-shopping strategy. 
Specifically, in what follows I trace two tactics deployed to exploit the complexities and 
ambiguities of the investment regime in order to advance and legitimate a position that diverged 
from the dominant norm.  
 
Strategy 1: Leveraging WTO Norms in PTA Negotiations 
The first example of norm shopping involved a discursive strategy that linked a set of inter-
regional negotiations back to the overarching multilateral organisation under which they were 
nested to combat attempted forum shopping by a more conventionally powerful player. The 
context for this was successful developing-country resistance to efforts to further embed the 
‘investment protection and liberalisation’ norm within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
When the EU sought investment liberalisation through a series of PTAs as an alternative 
governance venue, South Africa contested this by linking these negotiations back to the rules 
and politicised debate that had emerged in the WTO. 
 
Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the EU saw the launch of a new round of 
multilateral negotiations under the WTO as an opportunity to introduce multilateral rules on 
transparency, national treatment and dispute settlement in investment (Woolcock 2011, p. 142). 
Brussels therefore pushed for the launch of a round that would include investment alongside 
three other ‘new’ trade issues – competition, public procurement and trade facilitation – known 
collectively as the ‘Singapore issues’. While their view of the issue of multilateral investment 
rules was ambiguous at that time,6 South African trade officials initially supported the launch 
of a broad-based trade round. In line with prevailing WTO norms, they argued that any new 
round should allow scope for reciprocal trade-offs between developed and developing countries 
in order to produce a balanced outcome (Keet 2005). 
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After the launch of the Doha Round, however, South African trade officials became 
increasingly cautious about calls for trade and regulatory liberalisation. South Africa therefore 
joined the ranks of more sceptical developing countries – first under the IBSA (India, Brazil 
and South Africa) group and then as part of the G20-T group of developing countries working 
within the WTO. These groups accused developed countries themselves of violating the WTO 
norm of reciprocity in their approach to the negotiations (see Efstathopoulos 2015, Hopewell 
2016). South African officials stressed that they had only agreed to the inclusion of the 
Singapore issues on the promise of improved agricultural market access from the EU and the 
US (World Trade Organization 2003, p. 9) and that they were not willing to make ‘painful 
concessions’ on issues such as investment in the absence of reciprocation from the North 
(World Trade Organization 2004, p. 44). Talks on investment ultimately broke down following 
the infamous Cancún Ministerial in 2003. 
 
According to existing theories of forum shopping, the EU should have been able to respond to 
the multilateral impasse by shifting its attention to alternative settings in which it could more 
readily deploy its market power. This is precisely what the EU attempted to do. Its response to 
the failure of the Cancún Ministerial and the ejection of three of the four Singapore issues from 
the Doha Round was to launch its Global Europe strategy in 2006. This centred on the pursuit 
of agreement on a range of regulatory issues, including investment, via deep PTAs with key 
trade partners. At the same time, the EU was pursuing a series of ‘Economic Partnership 
Agreements’ (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, including South 
Africa. These PTAs were designed as a replacement for the system of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences that the ACP group had received under the Lomé Convention since 1975 (see 
Murray-Evans 2019). While the EPAs were not formally part of the Global Europe strategy, 
the European Commission became increasingly insistent during the course of the negotiations 
that they should include binding commitments on investment and other trade-related regulatory 
issues (Siles-Brügge 2014, p. 130–41, Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012). In relation to investment 
specifically, Brussels sought liberalisation commitments including the prohibition of a variety 
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of instruments used to limit foreign investment and MFN treatment in the pre-establishment 
phase (Van Harten 2008, p. 1–2).7 
 
South Africa played a leading role in resisting the inclusion of investment (as well as the other 
Singapore issues) in the EPAs through a norm-shopping strategy. Having rejected the WTO as 
a site for new investment rules, discursive appeals to this organisation and its rules nonetheless 
served South Africa’s purpose in resisting a similar set of rules via PTA negotiations. Indeed, 
the EU’s original rationale for the launch of the EPA negotiations was the need to render 
existing EU-ACP trade relations under the Lomé Convention compatible with WTO rules 
(Heron 2011). In order to do this, the European Commission argued, this relationship would 
need to achieve conformity with GATT article XXIV, which requires reciprocal liberalisation 
of trade in goods in PTAs (see Heron and Murray-Evans 2017). South Africa contested the 
EU’s desire to include the Singapore issues in the EPAs by stressing the limits to WTO 
requirements set out by article XXIV and by linking the EPAs to the politicised debate over 
investment and the other Singapore issues that had taken place in the WTO. 
 
In the strategic negotiating framework drawn up in 2006 by South Africa and its regional 
partners in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) EPA negotiating group, 
the region acknowledged the need to obtain compatibility with article XXIV by offering 
reciprocal tariff reductions to the EU (SADC 2006, p. 2).8 However, South African actors used 
this same multilateral rule to contest the inclusion of investment in the agreements. The SADC 
negotiating framework made it clear that Article XXIV covered trade in goods only, with no 
mention of the Singapore issues and that consequently ‘there [was] no compulsion to negotiate 
the so-called new generation trade issues under the EPA to meet the requirements of WTO 
compatibility’ (SADC 2006, p. 4). South Africa and its SADC partners also made clear in this 
document that the proper place for negotiations on investment was at the WTO, where 
developing countries had opposed the EU’s agenda. They argued: ‘by negotiating these issues 
bilaterally, SADC EPA Member States would be complicit in bypassing WTO negotiations or 
prejudging its negotiating positions in the Doha round’ (SADC 2006, p. 5).  
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When the deadline for the EPA negotiations arrived at the end of 2007, South Africa and the 
EU had reached a stalemate. South African Minister of Trade and Industry Rob Davies placed 
the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of the EU. He again stressed South Africa’s 
willingness to reach a deal that would be compatible with WTO rules and used those rules to 
make the case that there was no requirement to include investment or the other new generation 
issues in any such deal: 
 
In the SADC region, the major problems have in fact arisen from the EU’s ambition to 
move the EPAs beyond WTO compatible free trade agreements covering trade in goods, 
to agreements also embracing trade in services and new generation issues, involving 
serious commitments in areas such as investment, government procurement, 
competition policy and the like (Davies 2008). 
 
South Africa’s chief trade negotiator, Xavier Carim (2009, p. 54), reiterated the point in 2009, 
arguing, ‘At the heart of the difficulties in EPA lies the disjuncture between the declaratory 
principles that launched the negotiations and the ambitions of the EC that go far beyond the 
need to transform ACP-EU trade relations into a WTO compatible arrangement.’ In addition, 
the South African government again justified its opposition to the inclusion of the Singapore 
issues in the EPA by stressing that these issues had ‘been excluded’ from the WTO (Department 
of Trade and Industry 2008). 
 
Other ACP countries and European civil society organisations joined South Africa in 
highlighting the tension between the EU’s own claims that the EPAs were designed to achieve 
compatibility with the relevant WTO rules covering free trade agreements and the substance of 
the EU’s negotiating position (see Del Felice 2012, Girvan 2012, Heron and Murray-Evans 
2017, Murray-Evans 2019). These tactics ultimately bore fruit as EU Trade Commissioner, 
Catherine Ashton, conceded that there would be ‘no question of forcing’ the inclusion of the 
new-generation issues into the EPAs against ACP wishes (Ashton 2009). The deal that was 
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eventually concluded between the EU and the SADC group in 2014 included no binding rules 
on investment or other regulatory issues, only rendezvous clauses requiring the parties to 
discuss these issues at a later date. There appears little prospect that these commitments to 
further discussions about investment under the EPA will be fulfilled.9 
 
Strategy 2: Engaging UNCTAD on Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Unlike with PTAs, there was no clear single multilateral focal point under which BITs were 
nested. South African officials consequently adopted a different type of norm-shopping strategy 
in order to justify their decision to roll back existing commitments in favour of a ‘regulated 
investment’ approach. Namely, they engaged with the development of a new set of norms in an 
organisation that was linked horizontally to the BITs regime before using these new norms to 
help to justify and legitimise their actions in the central BITs regime itself. More specifically, 
South African officials contributed to the emergence of new thinking on development and 
investment governance within UNCTAD before using this to help justify their decision to 
terminate a series of BITs. 
 
The ANC government’s decision to sign a series of BITs with European countries10 in the late 
1990s reflected the proliferation of this type of agreement at that time, as well as the 
government’s liberal foreign economic policy stance. In a context in which attracting increasing 
levels of inward investment was central to generating rapid economic growth, South African 
officials reportedly saw BITs as a ‘risk-free instrument to attract investment’ (Poulsen 2014, p. 
8). A more critical stance towards BITs first emerged following two investor-state legal cases 
brought under these treaties in the 2000s (for details, see Department of Trade and Industry and 
Department of Mineral Resources 2010). 11  These cases made South African government 
officials aware of the potential under BITs for legal challenges to domestic policies that had 
been arrived at through democratic processes.12  
 
The government subsequently launched a three-year review of South Africa’s investment 
policies in 2007. It identified a series of concerns about existing BITs, including misalignment 
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with rules on expropriation in the South African constitution, a lack of any clear relationship 
between BITs and increased inward investment, and the imprecise legal terms of the 
agreements and their enforcement through opaque and unpredictable processes of international 
arbitration (Department of Trade and Industry 2009). The review culminated in a decision by 
the Cabinet in 2010 that South Africa should refrain from signing new BITs, should review 
those signed in the 1990s with a view to termination and possible renegotiation, and should 
strengthen domestic legislation in relation to the protection of foreign investors (Carim 2015, 
p. 4). BITs with Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, Spain, 
Austria, Denmark, France and the UK were subsequently terminated, a brake on the signing of 
new BITs imposed, and consultation on a new Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
(later the Protection of Investment Act) began. 
 
South African officials worked hard to persuade both domestic and international stakeholders 
– public and private – of the legitimacy of their decision. Where other developing countries 
used populist rhetoric to justify a turn against the prevailing investment regime,13 South Africa 
took a more conciliatory approach that sought to avoid the impression that the government was 
abandoning international standards of investment governance or abrogating its commitment to 
the protection of foreign investments altogether. An extensive domestic policy review and 
consultation process was a major part of this effort (Mossallam 2015). Alongside this, South 
Africa also sought active engagement with an emerging international debate about the future 
of investment governance across a range of organisational settings linked to the network of 
BITs. 
 
Between 2009 and 2012, South Africa used a series of ‘Freedom of Investment Roundtables’ 
hosted by the OECD as one venue for communicating its rationale for terminating BITs to 
external partners (see, in particular, OECD 2012, p. 7–9).14 Officials also took the opportunity 
to test the ideas emerging from their BITs review by engaging with discussions on investment 
in the G8+5 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US and Russia, plus Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico and South Africa) in 2008 and 2009.15 However, UNCTAD proved to be 
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the organisational setting that was most amenable to South Africa’s new approach to regulating 
investment. 
 
UNCTAD played an important role in the evolution of the contemporary investment regime, in 
particular by spreading ‘the causal belief that [BITs] were important to attract foreign 
investment’ to developing countries during the 1990s (Poulsen 2015, p. 71). A shift in 
UNCTAD’s orientation towards a more critical and questioning approach from around 2010 
(Poulsen 2015, p. 99) dovetailed with South Africa’s own critical stance that had emerged in 
the years immediately before. The country’s officials were therefore able to both contribute to 
debates emerging in UNCTAD in order to further the latter’s critique of BITs, and use 
UNCTAD outputs to help legitimate their own termination decision. Shortly after the South 
African investment policy review, UNCTAD responded to what it referred to as a ‘a new 
generation of investment policies’ that aimed to ‘regulate investment in pursuit of public policy 
objectives’ (UNCTAD 2012, p. 4–5). The South African review was an important part of this 
trend, and was used explicitly as an example of the growing questions surrounding BITs by the 
body’s officials.16 Its move to reflect on new trends in investment policy was also a response 
to the Seoul Declaration of the G20 from 2010, for which South Africa was co-chair alongside 
Korea, and which had made commitments to strengthening the sustainable development 
dimension of investment policies (UNCTAD 2012, p. 1). 
 
This, in turn, led to the launch of UNCTAD’s Investment Policy for Sustainable Development 
(IPFSD) in July 2012. This acknowledged that states were beginning to play a greater role in 
governing economies and described an emerging investment policy outlook that ‘reflects the 
recognition that liberalization, if it is to generate sustainable development outcomes, has to be 
accompanied – if not preceded – by the establishment of proper regulatory and institutional 
frameworks’ (UNCTAD 2012, p. 5). In light of this, the document set out principles to guide 
investment policymaking and a menu of options for developing countries in relation to both 
national investment policies and the design and use of international investment agreements. 
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UNCTAD reportedly actively sought the participation of high-level South African Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) officials in forums in which the issue of investment for sustainable 
development was discussed.17 The latter took the opportunity to engage with this process: they 
articulated a view of investment regulation that was critical of core tenets of the established 
network of BITs and chimed closely with the new UNCTAD approach. At a launch event for 
the IPFSD held in South Africa in July 2012, the aforementioned Davies (2012b) drew a sharp 
distinction between a ‘Freedom of Investment Model (FOI)’ that had shaped the BITs regime 
and ‘an Investment for Sustainable Development Model (ISD)’ now associated with UNCTAD. 
The latter approach, he said, ‘posits that regulations are needed to balance the economic 
requirements of investors with the need to ensure that investments make a positive contribution 
to sustainable development in the host state’ (Davies 2012b). Officials repeatedly aligned their 
own approach with the language of ‘sustainable development’ used in the IPFSD and suggested 
that BITs signed in the 1990s represented an out-dated approach based on the ‘Freedom of 
Investment’ model (Davies 2012a, 2012b, 2016, Carim 2015). In this way, they were able to 
draw on debates and emerging norms within UNCTAD in order to challenge aspects of the 
dominant ‘investment protection and liberalisation’ norm (or, as it was called by South African 
officials, the ‘freedom of investment’ model). 
 
In designing the Protection of Investment Act that would replace the BITs, South Africa’s 
engagement with UNCTAD again provided a way to bolster its approach. The Act replicates a 
number of features of BITs, but deviates in crucial aspects with the aim of redressing the 
perceived imbalance between investor protections and regulatory space for the state. A key 
change is that foreign investors do not have access to international arbitration for the resolution 
of disputes, which will instead be handled by a mediation process managed by the DTI.18 The 
UNCTAD IPFSD guidelines were reportedly important in helping South African officials to 
shape the Act.19 The Director of the Investment and Enterprise Division at UNCTAD, James 
Zhan, was invited to give evidence on it to the South African Parliamentary Trade and Industry 
Committee. He stated that ‘the Bill holds well with new international norms as well as 
 21 
UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Framework’ and ‘applauded the progress [the government] had 
made in keeping up with evolving international norms’ (Trade and Industry Committee 2015). 
 
The reception to South Africa’s decision to terminate its BITs was mixed and there was 
criticism, in particular, from European Commission officials, European state diplomats and 
chambers of commerce (Woolfrey 2013, Allix 2015). However, some European officials 
ultimately acknowledged that they understood and sympathised with South Africa’s reasons 
for terminating the BITs and stressed that their main objection was not to the substance of this 
decision but to procedural issues related to the termination process.20 A South African official 
suggested that, while the country had received significant pushback in the first two or three 
years after it announced the decision to terminate, this had subsequently been accepted by the 
relevant partners. 21  There has been concern over sluggish investment in South Africa 
subsequently, 22  but conclusively linking these outcomes is extremely difficult given the 
complexity of factors that influence decisions by inward investors. Indeed, European officials 
cited a range of issues, including a generalised rise in political uncertainty under the Zuma 
Presidency, as important factors affecting inward investment beyond the decision to terminate 
BITs. 23  They also suggested that, although South Africa was seen as becoming more 
interventionist in its investment policy, it was far from reaching a ‘tipping point’ in which 
investors would be discouraged from entering the market altogether.24 Although there has been 
a rise in inward investment from other partners – notably China – the European countries with 
which South Africa chose to terminate BITs remain by far the country’s most important sources 
of inward investment (Santander 2017). What is clear from this discussion is that South Africa’s 
engagement with UNCTAD was an important part of the process of shifting and justifying its 
approach towards the prevailing investment treaty regime. Furthermore, this made sense 
precisely because UNCTAD was involved in a process of questioning the utility and 
appropriateness of BITs for developing countries when South Africa was doing likewise. 
 
South Africa and the Future of Investment Governance 
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South Africa’s domestic reforms and engagement with the broader investment regime were part 
of a broader questioning of the ‘investment protection and liberalisation’ norm. European 
countries expressed similar concerns about the investment provisions in negotiations for the 
proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US (Mossallam 2015, 
p. 26). The South African approach helped to shape some of these debates. European civil 
society organisations cited South Africa’s decision to abandon BITs in support of their 
opposition to proposed investment provisions in TTIP (see for example CEO 2013a, 2013b, 
2014).25 South African officials were also asked to discuss their experiences in reviewing and 
terminating BITs in European countries as part of TTIP debates.26  
 
Investment has simultaneously been an important part of discussions in new global forums, 
most notably the G20’s Trade and Investment Working Group established by China during its 
2016 Presidency. The appearance of this issue at the G20 is at least in part a reflection of 
China’s transition from net inward investor to net capital exporter, and is an agenda being 
driven by China, Brazil, Russia and Argentina (Singh 2017). UNCTAD’s IPFSD helped to 
shape a set of non-binding Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking adopted by 
the G20 at the Hangzhou summit in 2016. UNCTAD facilitated discussions of the guidelines 
and the final document drew on the IPFSD (Zhan 2016, UNCTAD 2016). One South African 
official described this document as a compromise between the previously dominant ‘freedom 
of investment’ paradigm and the ‘investment for sustainable development’ paradigm that had 
shaped South Africa’s BITs policy.27 The same official suggested that a relative consensus had 
emerged on the need for reform of the international treaty framework for investment, but not 
on the direction that this reform should take.28 Separately, EU proposals for the creation of a 
multilateral investment court have likewise been understood as part of a process of incremental 
reform of the investment regime (Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 30). 
 
Debate on investment in the G20 subsequently moved on to the issue of ‘investment 
facilitation’, which was identified by the German Presidency in 2017 as one of three priorities 
in the area of trade and investment. Facilitation includes measures to improve transparency as 
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well as streamlining administrative procedures and improving the predictability and 
consistency of regulatory environments (Singh 2017). Proposals for multilateral discussions on 
investment facilitation were also submitted to the WTO General Council in April and May 2017 
by, amongst others, China, Russia, Argentina and Brazil (Singh 2017, p. 3). Discussions on a 
draft deliverable on investment facilitation at the G20 in May 2017 were intended as preparation 
for these discussions at the WTO, but reached stalemate when South Africa, India and the US 
refused to sign onto the draft text (Kanth 2017a). Shortly thereafter India blocked discussion of 
investment facilitation at the WTO General Council, citing the exclusion of the issue of 
investment from the WTO’s mandate (Kanth 2017b). For its part, South Africa remained 
opposed to any WTO negotiations on investment facilitation on the grounds that binding rules 
that are subject to multilateral oversight and dispute settlement in the WTO would constitute 
an unacceptable constraint on the government’s regulatory autonomy.29  
 
The next test of South Africa’s strategy for engagement with the investment regime and its 
efforts to avoid being subject to further investment liberalisation and protection provisions in 
international treaties will be how it responds to the renewed calls for talks on investment in the 
WTO. That these are now coming from large emerging economies as opposed to the established 
powers may pose a new challenge and exposes fault lines over trade and investment policy that 
exist even within the BRICS group. Furthermore, this latest development calls attention to 
tensions within South Africa’s own discursive strategy in relation to investment. In particular, 
in opposing investment rules in regional and bilateral PTAs, South African officials were keen 
to portray the country as a committed multilateralist and to argue that the WTO is the proper 
venue for addressing new trade issues. Yet given that South Africa harbours deep suspicions of 
binding negotiations on new trade issues in the WTO, it may be accused of hypocrisy if it is 
seen to be one of the states blocking progress on these issues in multilateral forums. At the 
regional level, South Africa may invite similar accusations given its approach to the governance 
of investment on the African continent, where it is principally a capital exporter. Here, it entered 
into a new BIT with Zimbabwe in order to protect South African investment even after it had 
initiated withdrawal from the broader treaty regime (Poulsen 2014, p. 11). 
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Consequently, while norm shopping may be a useful strategy for ambitious rising powers 
seeking to challenge the authority of more conventionally powerful actors, the strategy may 
have pitfalls too. First, there is no guarantee that the rising powers as a group will have 
consistent preferences, or that they will pursue them in similar ways across the global economic 
governance landscape. Without some level of collective action on the part of the putative 
representatives of the Global South, these strategies will likely have limited impact. Second, 
maintaining consistency in normative strategies across multiple organisational settings is likely 
to be a requirement for the overall success of norm-shopping strategies. Cross-institutional 
normative strategies that can be portrayed as hypocritical or contradictory may undermine the 
overall power and legitimacy of norm shopping. 
 
Conclusion 
Beginning in the late 2000s, South Africa implemented an investment policy that ran counter 
to the dominant ‘investment protection and liberalisation’ norm, while contributing to a broader 
process of questioning this norm across the investment regime complex as a whole. I have 
argued that its strategy for doing so can be labelled ‘norm shopping’ – defined as the selective 
engagement with and construction of norms situated within complex regimes in order to 
legitimate and justify negotiating positions or policy proposals. This strategy, in turn, relied on 
the unevenness and normative ambiguity of the regime complex for investment, as well as the 
way in which different parts of the regime were connected through institutional linkages. 
Specifically, I identified two key norm-shopping tactics on the part of South Africa. The first 
involved discursive appeals to the rules and processes of an overarching multilateral institution 
(the WTO) in order to contest the actions of a more conventionally powerful actor (the EU) in 
a nested negotiating setting (the EPA negotiations). The second involved contributing to 
normative innovation in one organisation linked to the regime complex (UNCTAD), before 
using those norms to justify action in relation to a more central part of the regime (the network 
of BITs). Together, these tactics allowed South Africa to justify a set of actions that diverged 
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with the central normative framework of the investment regime complex without appearing exit 
or contravene the regime altogether. 
 
This account presents a challenge to conventional ways of viewing the political consequences 
of regime complexity. Existing accounts of regime complexity predict that the fracturing of 
multilateral institutions and the proliferation of overlapping governance venues will lead to a 
transition from rules-based to power-based forms of governance. These accounts are based on 
a view that privileges state power, and that views this power principally in terms of material 
coercion. In this context, few scholars have actively engaged with the question of how those 
states outside of the core group of great powers can engage strategically with complex regimes. 
In order to address this question, my approach brought in two core contributions from ‘critical’ 
constructivist literatures in IR. First, I extended existing claims about the ambiguity of 
international norms in order to apply these to situations of regime complexity. Second, I 
emphasised the role of strategic rhetorical action in the operation of power and the 
embeddedness of this rhetorical action within established institutional structures that help to set 
the parameters of legitimate behaviour on the global stage. This approach allowed me to 
emphasise the way in which complex regimes create opportunities for the contestation of 
dominant norms through strategic and selective engagement by actors that lack the material 
capabilities of established or emerging great powers. In this way, the article provides a 
counterpoint to claims that regime complexity automatically presages a return to power-based 
politics as well as exploring norm shopping as a specific strategy through which aspirant rising 
powers can engage with complex institutional environments in global economic governance. 
 
1 The analysis draws on publicly available documents from the South African government, 
WTO, UNCTAD, the EU and others, as well as a series of interviews and background briefings 
conducted by the author in South Africa and Botswana in 2011-12 and in South Africa in 2017. 
The first set of interviews focused on negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement 




BITs. The relevant interviews numbered 30 in total. The interviews were conducted with ethics 
approval from the University of Sheffield (first set of interviews) and University of York 
(second set of interviews). Interviewees were informed that the responses they gave would be 
used in published material and were offered anonymity in order to enable them to speak freely 
– most of the interviews are therefore cited anonymously. 
2 On the contemporary rise of multipolatiry and deadlock in the Doha Round, see Capling and 
Higgott 2009, Mattoo and Subramanian 2009, Aggarwal and Evenett 2013, Laïdi 2014, Gamble 
2015, Muzaka and Bishop 2015. 
3 Like Krebs and Jackson (2007), I acknowledge that it is very difficult to determine empirically 
the ‘true’ motivations for actors’ behaviour and doing so is not necessary for the purposes of 
this article, which is more interested in strategy that intent. My assumption is that agents act 
strategically and on the basis of interests, but that these interests and strategies are infused with 
social norms (see Seabrooke 2006, Murray-Evans 2019). 
4 For extended analyses of the international organisations and agreements that deal with cross-
border investment, see UNCTAD 2004, Vandevelde 2005, Elkins et al. 2006, Reiter 2006, 
Woolcock 2011, 2015, Bonnitcha et al. 2017. 
5  A number of insightful explorations of South Africa’s foreign policy in this period are 
available (Hamill and Lee 2001, Bischoff 2003, Taylor and Williams 2006, Alden and Le Pere 
2009, Serrão and Bischoff 2009). 
6 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
7 The investment provisions listed are those that were included in the Cariforum EPA – the only 
comprehensive EPA thus far concluded between the EU and an ACP region (see Heron 2011, 
Bishop et al. 2013). While the EPA did not include post-establishment protections, Gus Van 
Harten (2008, p. 2) argues that the MFN clause could be read expansively to incorporate post-
establishment protections from other investment treaties. 
8 The SADC Strategic Framework suggested that Least Developed Countries (LDCs) should 
not have to offer reciprocal tariff liberalisation because these countries could instead access the 
EU market via the EU’s unilateral Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme (SADC 2006, p. 44–5). 
9 Confidential interview with a South African government official, May 2017. 
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10 The countries involved were Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. 
11 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
12 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
13 For example, in a speech about ICSID in 2012, President Hugo Chavez justified Venezuela’s 
turn against the investment treaty regime by saying, ‘[W]e are not going to bow down to 
imperialism and its tentacles!’ (quoted in Bonnitcha et al. 2017, p. 227). 
14 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
15 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
16 Confidential interview with a South African researcher, May 2017. 
17 Private correspondence with an expert on investment governance and confidential interview 
with a South African researcher, May 2017. 
18 Draft versions of the Act also placed limits on the protections provided to foreign investors 
in various ways. For example, the drafts included an expansive definition of actions by the state 
that should be considered in the public interest and therefore exempt from restrictions on 
expropriation. However, at the time of writing the regulations that had been published in order 
to bring the Act into force covered only the section of the Act that dealt with dispute settlement 
(see Langalanga 2015, 2017). 
19 Confidential interview with a South African government official, May 2017. 
20 Interview with Falk Bömeke, May 2017; confidential interview with a European official, 
May 2017. 
21 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
22 Interview with Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, August 2018. 
23 Interview with Falk Bömeke, May 2017; confidential interview with a European official, 
May 2017. 
24 Interview with Falk Bömeke, May 2017. 
25 For a discussion of NGO opposition to ISDS in TTIP, see De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, 
p. 102-5. 
26 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
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27 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
28 Confidential interview with a South African government official, October 2017. 
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